Why Western Is Getting Popular Again

The Iron Curtain that once divided Europe may be long gone, but the continent today is split by stark differences in public attitudes toward religion, minorities and social problems such every bit gay marriage and legal abortion. Compared with Western Europeans, fewer Central and Eastern Europeans would welcome Muslims or Jews into their families or neighborhoods, extend the correct of marriage to gay or lesbian couples or augment the definition of national identity to include people built-in outside their country.

These differences emerge from a serial of surveys conducted by Pew Research Heart betwixt 2015 and 2017 amongst nigh 56,000 adults (ages eighteen and older) in 34 Western, Central and Eastern European countries, and they continue to carve up the continent more than a decade subsequently the Eu began to expand well beyond its Western European roots to include, amongst others, the Cardinal European countries of Poland and Republic of hungary, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The continental divide in attitudes and values can be extreme in some cases. For example, in almost every Key and Eastern European country polled, fewer than half of adults say they would be willing to accept Muslims into their family; in nearly every Western European land surveyed, more than half say they would have a Muslim into their family. A similar divide emerges between Central/Eastern Europe and Western Europe with regard to accepting Jews into one's family.

In a separate question, Western Europeans also are much more probable than their Central and Eastern European counterparts to say they would accept Muslims in their neighborhoods.¹ For example, 83% of Finns say they would be willing to accept Muslims as neighbors, compared with 55% of Ukrainians. And although the divide is less stark, Western Europeans are more likely to limited acceptance toward Jews in their neighborhoods as well.

Defining the boundaries of Eastern and Western Europe

The definition and boundaries of Central, Eastern and Western Europe tin be debated. No thing where the lines are drawn, notwithstanding, at that place are strong geographic patterns in how people view organized religion, national identity, minorities and primal social issues. Particularly sharp differences emerge when comparing attitudes in countries historically associated with Eastern vs. Western Europe.

In countries that are centrally located on the continent, prevailing attitudes may align with pop opinions in the East on some issues, while more closely reflecting Western public sentiment on other matters. For instance, Czechs are highly secular, by and large favor same-sex activity matrimony and do not associate Christianity with their national identity, like to almost Western Europeans. Merely Czechs also express low levels of acceptance toward Muslims, more closely resembling their neighbors in the E. And most Hungarians say that existence born in their land and having Hungarian beginnings are of import to being truly Hungarian – a typically Eastern European view of national identity. Yet, at the same time, only almost six-in-ten Hungarians believe in God, reflecting Western European levels of belief.

In some other cases, Central European countries autumn between the East and the West. Roughly half of Slovaks, for example, say they favor same-sex wedlock, and a similar share say they would accept Muslims in their family unit – lower shares than in virtually Western European countries, but well above their neighbors in the East. And even so others simply lean toward the East on most issues, as Poland does on views of national identity and Muslims, every bit well as aforementioned-sex marriage and ballgame.

Researchers included Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the Baltics and the Balkans as office of "Central and Eastern Europe" because all these countries were part of the Soviet sphere of influence in the 20th century. Although Greece was not part of the Eastern bloc, information technology is categorized in Central and Eastern Europe because of both its geographical location and its public attitudes, which are more in line with Eastern than Western Europe on the issues covered in this report. For example, most Greeks say they are not willing to accept Muslims in their families; three-quarters consider being Orthodox Christian of import to being truly Greek; and most nine-in-ten say Greek culture is superior to others. Due east Deutschland is another unusual instance; information technology was function of the Eastern bloc, but is now included in Western Europe as part of a reunified Germany.

Attitudes toward religious minorities in the region get hand in hand with differing conceptions of national identity. When they were in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, many Primal and Eastern European countries officially kept religion out of public life. Merely today, for most people living in the former Eastern bloc, beingness Christian (whether Catholic or Orthodox) is an important component of their national identity.

In Western Europe, by contrast, most people don't feel that religion is a major part of their national identity. In France and the Uk, for case, almost say it is non of import to be Christian to be truly French or truly British.

To be sure, not every land in Europe neatly falls into this pattern. For instance, in the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia, the vast majority of people say being Christian (specifically Lutheran) is non important to their national identity. Withal, relatively few express willingness to have Muslims as family unit members or neighbors.

But a general E-West design is as well apparent on at least ane other measure of nationalism: cultural chauvinism. The surveys asked respondents across the continent whether they concur with the argument, "Our people are not perfect, but our civilisation is superior to others." While there are exceptions, Key and Eastern Europeans overall are more inclined to say their culture is superior. The viii countries where this mental attitude is about prevalent are all geographically in the Due east: Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Russia, Bosnia, Romania and Serbia.

People in Central and Eastern Europe as well are more probable than Western Europeans to say being built-in in their country and having family background in that location are of import to truly share the national identity (e.g., to exist truly Romanaian; see hither.).

Taken together, these and other questions well-nigh national identity, religious minorities and cultural superiority would seem to signal a European split up, with high levels of religious nationalism in the Due east and more than openness toward multiculturalism in the West. Other questions asked on the survey signal to a farther East-West "values gap" with respect to fundamental social issues, such as same-sex marriage and legal abortion.

Differences over the pregnant of 'European values'

Is Christianity a "European value?" What virtually secularism? And how about multiculturalism and open borders?

Leaders often cite European values when defending their stances on highly charged political topics. Only the term "European values" tin can hateful different things to different people. For some, it conjures up the continent's Christian heritage; for others, it connotes a broader political liberalism that encompasses a separation between church and country, asylum for refugees, and democratic government.

For the European Union, whose members include 24 of the 34 countries surveyed in this report, the term "European values" tends to signify what Americans might consider liberal ideals.² The "Charter of Primal Rights of the European union" includes respect for cultural and religious diversity; prohibitions against discrimination based on religion and sexual orientation; the right to asylum for refugees; and guarantees of freedom of movement inside the European union.³

These rights and principles are part of the EU's legal system and have been affirmed in decisions of the European Court of Justice going back decades.⁴ But the membership of the European union has inverse in recent years, beginning in 2004 to spread significantly from its celebrated western base into Cardinal and Eastern Europe. Since that year, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Republic of lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have joined the European union. In many of these countries, the surveys show that people are less receptive to religious and cultural pluralism than they are in Western Europe – challenging the notion of universal assent to a set of European values.

These are non the only issues dividing Eastern and Western Europe.⁵ But they take been in the news since a surge in clearing to Europe brought record levels of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries and sparked fierce debates among European leaders and policymakers well-nigh edge policies and national values.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has articulated one strain of opposition to the EU's conception of European values, declaring in July 2018 that "Central Europe … has a special culture. It is different from Western Europe." Every European country, he said, "has the right to defend its Christian culture, and the right to reject the ideology of multiculturalism," as well as the right to "decline immigration" and to "defend the traditional family unit model." Earlier in the year, in an address to the Hungarian parliament, he criticized the EU stance on migration: "In Brussels at present, thousands of paid activists, bureaucrats and politicians piece of work in the direction that migration should be considered a human being right. … That's why they want to take away from usa the right to determine with whom we want to live."

This is not to suggest that support for multiculturalism is universal even in Western Europe. Substantial shares of the public in many Western European countries view being Christian every bit a key component of their national identity and say they would not accept Muslims or Jews every bit relatives. And of course, the United Kingdom voted in 2016 to get out the European Union, which many have suggested came in office due to concerns about clearing and open borders. But on the whole, people in Western European countries are much more likely than their neighbors in the Eastward to cover multiculturalism.

Majorities favor aforementioned-sex matrimony in every Western European country surveyed, and near all of these countries have legalized the practise. Public sentiment is very different in Primal and Eastern Europe, where majorities in nearly all countries surveyed oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally. None of the Primal and Eastern European countries surveyed allow same-sex marriages.

In some cases, these views are nigh universally held. Fully nine-in-ten Russians, for case, oppose legal same-sex marriage, while similarly lopsided majorities in the Netherlands, Kingdom of denmark and Sweden favor allowing gay and lesbian couples to ally legally.

Even though abortion generally is legal in both Central/Eastern and Western Europe, there are regional differences in views on this topic, besides.⁶ In every Western European nation surveyed – including the heavily Catholic countries of Ireland, Italia and Portugal – six-in-ten or more adults say abortion should be legal in all or near cases.

Merely in the Eastward, views are more than varied. To be sure, some Fundamental and Eastern European countries, such as the Czech republic, Estonia and Republic of bulgaria, overwhelmingly favor legal abortion. But in several others, including Poland, Russia and Ukraine, the balance of opinion tilts in the other management, with respondents more likely to say that abortion should exist by and large or entirely illegal.

Survey results propose that Europe'south regional divide over same-sex marriage could persist into the hereafter: Beyond near of Key and Eastern Europe, young adults oppose legalizing gay marriage past only somewhat narrower margins than do their elders.

For instance, 61% of younger Estonians (ages xviii to 34) oppose legal gay marriage in their land, compared with 75% of those 35 and older. By this measure, young Estonian adults are still six times as likely as older adults in Kingdom of denmark (10%) to oppose aforementioned-sexual activity marriage. This pattern holds across the region; young adults in nearly every Central and Eastern European country are much more than conservative on this issue compared with both younger and older Western Europeans.

In addition, when it comes to views about Muslims and Jews, young adults in virtually countries in Primal and Eastern Europe are no more than accepting than their elders.

Consequently, those in this younger generation in Central and Eastern Europe are much less likely than their peers in Western Europe to express openness to having Muslims or Jews in their families. For instance, 36% of Smooth adults under 35 say they would be willing to take Muslims in their family, far below the 2-thirds of young French adults who say they would be willing to have Muslims in their family – mirroring the overall publics in those countries.

These are among the findings of Pew Research Center surveys conducted beyond Central and Eastern Europe in 2015 and 2016 and Western Europe in 2017.⁷

The Middle previously has published major reports on both surveys: "Religious Conventionalities and National Belonging in Key and Eastern Europe" and "Existence Christian in Western Europe." Many of the same questions were asked in both regions, allowing for the comparisons in this report. The Central and Eastern Europe surveys were conducted via contiguous-interviews, while Western Europeans were surveyed by phone. Run into Methodology for details.

The rest of this report will await at more cross-regional comparisons, including:

• Identification with Christianity has declined over time across Western Europe, but this is not the case in much of Central and Eastern Europe. In most countries in the East, the share of Christians has remained fairly stable in recent generations. And in a few countries, including Russian federation, Christians accept increased as a pct of the population.

• Compared with the rest of the world, the entire European continent has relatively low levels of traditional religious do (e.g., church attendance, prayer), but they are slightly higher in Primal and Eastern Europe than in the West. On residue, Cardinal and Eastern Europeans besides are more likely to say they believe in God, and to express some New Age or folk religious behavior – such equally that certain people can cast curses or spells that crusade bad things to happen to someone (the "evil eye").

• Across the continent, Europeans more often than not say religion and government should be kept separate. Simply this view is more than widespread in Western Europe, while several Central and Eastern European countries are more than divided. For example, 46% of Romanians say their authorities should promote religious values and beliefs.

• In addition to the importance of religion to national identity, the surveys likewise asked well-nigh several other possible elements of national identity. People throughout the continent say it is important to respect national institutions and laws and speak the ascendant national linguistic communication to be a true member of their country, but Central and Eastern Europeans are especially likely to say that nativist elements of national identity – being built-in in a state and having family ancestry in that location – are very of import.

Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism are each prominent in different parts of Europe

Christianity has long been the prevailing organized religion in Europe, and it remains the majority religious affiliation in 27 of the 34 countries surveyed. But historical schisms underlie this mutual religious identity: Each of the three major Christian traditions – Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy – predominates in a sure part of the continent.

Orthodoxy is the dominant faith in the East, including in Greece, Russia, the quondam Soviet republics of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus, and other quondam Eastern bloc countries such every bit Serbia, Romania and Republic of bulgaria. Catholic-majority countries are prevalent in the central and southwestern parts of Europe, cutting a swath from Lithuania through Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, and so extending westward across Croatia, Austria, Italy and France to the Iberian Peninsula. And Protestantism is the dominant Christian tradition in much of Northern Europe, particularly Scandinavia.

There are substantial populations belonging to non-Christian religions – especially Islam – in many European countries. In Bosnia, roughly one-half of the population is Muslim, while Russian federation and Bulgaria have sizable Muslim minority populations. But in nigh other countries surveyed, Muslims and Jews brand up relatively minor shares of the population, and surveys oftentimes are not able to reliably measure their precise size.

In add-on, all the Western European countries surveyed take sizable populations of religiously unaffiliated people – those who identify every bit atheist, agnostic or "aught in item," collectively sometimes chosen "nones." "Nones" make up at least 15% of the population in every Western European country surveyed, and they are particularly numerous in kingdom of the netherlands (48%), Norway (43%) and Sweden (42%). On balance, at that place are smaller shares of "nones" – and larger shares of Christians – in Central and Eastern Europe, though a plurality of Estonians (45%) are unaffiliated, and the Czechia is the only country surveyed on the entire continent where "nones" form a majority (72%).

Christian affiliation has declined in Western Europe

The lower Christian shares in Western Europe reflect how the region's religious landscape has been changing within the lifetimes of survey respondents.

While big majorities across the continent say they were baptized Christian, and near European countries yet have solid Christian majorities, the survey responses signal a pregnant decline in Christian affiliation throughout Western Europe. Past contrast, this trend has not been seen in Central and Eastern Europe, where Christian shares of the population have mostly been stable or even increasing.

Indeed, in a part of the region where communist regimes one time repressed religious worship, Christian amalgamation has shown a resurgence in some countries since the fall of the USSR in 1991. In Ukraine, for example, more people say they are Christian now (93%) than say they were raised Christian (81%); the same is true in Russia, Belarus and Armenia. In most other parts of Key and Eastern Europe, Christian shares of the population have been relatively stable by this measure.

Meanwhile, far fewer Western Europeans say they are currently Christian than say they were raised Christian. In Belgium, for case, 55% of respondents currently identify as Christian, compared with 83% saying they were raised Christian.

What are the reasons for these opposing patterns on dissimilar sides of the continent? Some appear to exist political: In Russian federation and Ukraine, the most common explanation given by those who were raised without a religion simply are now Orthodox is that religion has become more acceptable in society. Some other important reason is a connection with their national heritage.

In Western Europe, there are a diverseness of reasons why many adults who were raised Christian take become unaffiliated. Most of these adults say they "gradually drifted abroad from religion," though many also say they disagreed with church positions on social issues similar homosexuality and abortion, and/or that they stopped believing in religious teachings.

Religious commitment peculiarly low in Western Europe

Non only is religious affiliation on the turn down in Western Europe, religious delivery as well is generally lower there than in Central and Eastern Europe.

This is not to say that Primal and Eastern Europeans are very religious by conventional measures of religious behavior. Europeans throughout the continent more often than not show far less religious delivery than adults previously surveyed in other regions.^viii

That said, on balance, Central and Eastern Europeans are more likely than Western Europeans to say that faith is very of import in their lives, that they nourish religious services at to the lowest degree monthly, and that they pray every day.

For example, fully half or more of adults in Greece, Bosnia, Armenia, Georgia and Romania say faith is very important in their lives, compared with about one-in-ten in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and several other Western European countries. Similarly, roughly three-in-ten Slovaks, Greeks and Ukrainians say they pray daily, compared with 8% in Austria and Switzerland. Western Europeans too are more likely than their neighbors in the Eastward to say they never pray (e.g., 62% in Kingdom of denmark vs. 28% in Russia).

Substantial shares in Western Europe don't believe in God

Western Europeans also limited belief in God at lower levels than people in Primal and Eastern Europe, where big majorities say they believe in God – including overwhelming shares in several countries, such as Georgia, Armenia, Moldova and Romania. Amidst the Central and Eastern European countries surveyed, in that location are only 3 exceptions where fewer than 2-thirds of adults say they believe in God: Republic of hungary (59%), Republic of estonia (44%) and the Czechia (29%).

By dissimilarity, fewer than two-thirds of adults in most Western European countries surveyed say they believe in God, and in some countries with large populations of "nones," such every bit the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, fewer than half of adults believe in God.

Western Europeans besides are less probable to say they are sure of their belief in God. Amid the Western European countries surveyed, only in Portugal (44%) do more three-in-x say they are absolutely certain that God exists. But majorities in several of the Cardinal and Eastern European countries surveyed express such certainty nearly God'southward existence, including in Romania (64%), Hellenic republic (59%) and Croatia (57%).

Majorities in most Central and Eastern European countries believe in fate

In improver to belief in God, Central and Eastern Europeans are more likely than Western Europeans to limited belief in fate (that the course of life is largely or wholly preordained), as well as in some phenomena not typically linked with Christianity, including the "evil eye" (that sure people can cast curses or spells that cause bad things to happen to someone).

Majorities in virtually Cardinal and Eastern European countries surveyed say they believe in fate, including about eight-in-ten in Armenia (83%) and Bosnia (fourscore%). In Western Europe, far fewer people believe their lives are preordained – roughly four-in-ten or fewer in most of the countries surveyed.

Conventionalities in the evil eye is also mutual in Cardinal and Eastern Europe. This belief is virtually widespread in Greece (66%), Latvia (66%), Ukraine (sixty%), Armenia (59%), Moldova (57%), Russian federation (56%) and Bulgaria (55%).

In fact, the levels of belief in the evil eye across Central and Eastern Europe are comparable to those institute in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, where indigenous religions take had a broad impact on the respective cultures. (Encounter "Faith in Latin America: Widespread Alter in a Historically Cosmic Region" and "Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.") In Western Europe, on the other paw, in no state does a majority express belief in the evil eye.

Levels of conventionalities in reincarnation are more comparable across the region. In nearly Central and Eastern European countries surveyed, a quarter or more say they believe in reincarnation – that is, that people will exist reborn in this world once more and again. In many Western European countries surveyed, roughly 1-fifth of the population expresses conventionalities in reincarnation, a concept more closely associated with Eastern religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism than with Christianity.

Prevailing view across Europe is that religion and government should be dissever

Europeans across the continent are largely united in back up of a separation between religion and authorities. More than than one-half of adults in most countries say religion should be kept carve up from government policies, rather than the opposing view that government policies should support religious values and behavior.

In vii Primal and Eastern European countries, however, the view that church and state should be dissever falls brusk of a majority position. This includes Armenia and Georgia – where the residuum of opinion favors government back up for religious values and beliefs – too as Russian federation, where 42% of adults say the government should promote religion.

In Western Europe, meanwhile, majorities in nearly every country surveyed say religion should be kept divide from government policies.

Historic period differences are stronger in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe on this event: Younger adults across most of Western Europe are more likely than those ages 35 and older to prefer separation of church building and state. In Fundamental and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, younger and older adults express roughly similar views on this question.

Europe split on importance of beginnings to national identity, united on importance of speaking national linguistic communication

While majorities in nigh Central and Eastern European countries tie being Christian to being truly Serbian, Polish, etc. (run into here), majorities in all of these countries view beingness born in their state and having beginnings there equally of import components of national identity.

For example, 83% of adults in Republic of hungary and 82% of adults in Poland say it is "very" or "somewhat" important to accept been built-in in their country to be "truly Hungarian" or "truly Polish." And 72% of Russians say it is important to have Russian family unit background to exist "truly Russian."

On remainder, adults in Western European countries are less probable to view these nativist elements as important to national identity. For example, majorities in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Kingdom of norway say it is "not very" or "non at all" important to be born in their state or take family background in that location to be "truly Swedish," etc.

But not everyone beyond Western Europe feels this fashion. In Portugal, for case, the vast majority of adults say that being born in Portugal (81%) and having a Portuguese family background (80%) are very or somewhat of import to being "truly Portuguese." These sentiments also are widespread amidst adults in Italy and Spain.

The ii sides of Europe do non appear to exist moving closer on these questions with younger generations. In fact, the opposite is true: In Western Europe, young adults (ages 18 to 34) are less likely than their elders to regard birthplace and beginnings as crucial to national identity, while in Cardinal and Eastern Europe, immature adults and older people are about equally likely to experience this manner. In Kingdom of spain, for instance, only about half of adults under 35 (47%) say having Spanish beginnings is of import to being Spanish, compared with 64% of older Spaniards. In Ukraine, meanwhile, young adults and older adults wait very similar on this question (68% vs. 69%).

Apropos the importance of family groundwork to national identity, there is a bigger gap betwixt young adults in Western Europe and young adults in Key and Eastern Europe than betwixt the adult populations as a whole.

While public opinion on the importance of religion, birthplace and beginnings to national identity is different in Central and Eastern Europe than it is in the West, people throughout the continent largely concur on some other elements of national belonging. Adults in both regions say it is important to respect their country's institutions and laws and to exist able to speak the national linguistic communication to truly share their national identity.

In fact, overwhelming majorities of adults in every European country surveyed – East and West akin – say information technology is important to respect the laws of their country in order to truly vest. For example, 98% of Danes, 96% of Hungarians and 87% of Russians say it is of import to respect their institutions and laws to truly exist Danish, Hungarian or Russian.

And large shares in both Eastern and Western European countries say speaking the national language is important to sharing their national identity. For example, in the Netherlands, 96% of adults say speaking Dutch is important for being truly Dutch. And in Georgia, 92% of adults say it is important to speak Georgian to truly share their national identity. There are a few countries, however, where this sentiment is somewhat less mutual: Only about two-thirds of adults in Moldova, Finland and Bosnia say speaking the national language is of import to truly belonging to their country, as practise only 62% of Ukrainians and 54% of Belarusians. This may reflect the fact that multiple languages are spoken in these countries, including big numbers of Russian speakers in Moldova, Ukraine and Republic of belarus.

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Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/